Abstract
Introduction
Th e processes which occur in the security environment fall in the area of security sciences and international relations sciences. In international relations sciences, the research is focused mainly on the level of the international systems and the main entities (states and organisations) which function in this system. Th e security policy of a state is infl uenced by the historical experience of a given state. However, it is determined above all by the changes which take place in the security environment which surrounds the policy. Th e increasingly aggressive Kremlin policy towards its neighbouring countries, which is a derivative of the more and more visible aspirations of the Russian Federation to regaining the international position it lost at the beginning of the 1990s, causes concern in many countries. Due to the fact that the actions taken by some states in this matter and the offi cial stances presented are almost homogeneous, it is worth grouping a few such states in order to obtain a wider perspective on a given region. Th e above observation is refl ected in the topic the author has chosen for this work. Th e purpose of the research is to identify the determinants which condition the development directions and the actions taken by the Baltic States to carry out an eff ective security policy. Th e research problem which arises from the adopted purpose of the research is an attempt to answer the following question:
How has the security policy of the Baltic states evolved since the moment they gained statehood and what changes in the security policy of these states have been brought about by the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the confl ict in the eastern part of Ukraine?
Th e author presumes that the dynamically changing security environment in Eastern Europe, which is a result of the political and military activity of Russia, may strongly determine the political and military situation in the region. One of the results of this infl uence is changes in the defence doctrines and strategies of the Baltic States. In the course of further considerations, the above-mentioned hypothesis will be subject to verifi cation with the assumption that the changes occurring in the security environment in Eastern Europe are of a permanent character and will not change their nature in the foreseeable future.
Th e time horizon of the research covers the period from the end of the World War I up to the present moment. Th e recent decades represent a fundamental period in which statehood was shaped and the directions of policies leading towards integration with the desired structures that were to provide the Baltic States with a sense of security were developed. In the research, the course and results of which are given below, we have adopted an analysis of the literature and source documents of doctrinal character relating to the Baltic States as the main research method. Th e overall work is to present the reaction of the Baltic States to the changes which have occurred in the neighbouring areas in the security environment.
Historical circumstances
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians of today are the heirs of diff erent traditions. Th ese nations, which live in a relatively small area on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, constitute a separate political and cultural entity on the international stage and often act together, presenting their points of view. Th e history of the nations living in today's Baltic States is marked by confl icts with stronger neighbours: Russia, Poland, Sweden, Denmark and German settlers. It should be noted that despite many similarities in modern times -size, location, natural resources or potential -the development of these countries has been carried out in diff erent ways over the centuries.
However, from the point of view of the undermentioned considerations, in order to discover the causes of these directions of security policy of the Baltic States, it is enough to refer to the end of the World War I, which is when these states regained their independence.
By creating their own, separate national cultures, Estonians and Latvians sought to reduce German infl uence and Lithuanians to reduce Polish infl uence. To this end, they have consciously shifted their focus to the cultures of Western Europe, especially French and English. Many people in Latvia and Estonia changed their German-sounding names to more familiar ones and the use of peripheral languages or dialects was perceived badly in all three countries (Kasekamp 2013, p. 119) . Th e policy towards national minorities in Lithuania, especially towards Poles, diff ered in its rhetoric from the policy towards national minorities in Latvia and Estonia. Th ere has been no radical change in the treatment of national minorities in these two countries. However, it should be noted that the Latvian and Estonian authorities treated the Baltic Germans, who had been deprived of the privileges they had enjoyed for several hundred years, the least favourably (Kasekamp 2013, p. 122) .
Given the common interest in security, cooperation between the Baltic States has not progressed as well as expected. Th ere were diff erences in risk perceptions between the Baltic States. For Estonia, Soviet Russia was a potential enemy; for Latvia, it was both Russia and Germany; while the Lithuanians in Soviet Russia saw counterbalances against Poland, with which the Latvians and the Estonians had increasingly close contacts. In addition, Lithuania had quite diffi cult relations with Germany. Th e relations between Lithuania and Germany became even more complicated after Hitler came to power. At that point, the region of Klaipeda, formerly in German possession and taken over by the Lithuanians after World War I, became a problem once again (Kasekamp 2013, p. 126) . Whereas, the dispute over Vilnius, mentioned earlier, stood in the way of an agreement between Poland and Lithuania.
In February 1921, Latvia and Estonia, through the recognition of Lithuania, brought the Balts closer together. Th e Latvian Foreign Minister, Zigfrids Meierovics, even proposed the creation of a Baltic Union of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, although there was an unoffi cial talk of a union with Poland and Finland as well. Lithuania was inclined to support the Latvian concept of the "tristate" Baltic Union, and the other Baltic States, as a consequence of accusations in the Estonian press of Polish adventurism and imperialism, seemed more inclined to establish a link with Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania with the exclusion of Poland (Łukasik-Duszyńska 2008, p. 194) .
As a result of negotiations, representatives of Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland signed an agreement on 17 March 1922 in Warsaw consisting of nine articles. In the event of an indiscriminate attack on a signatory, Article 7 obliged the other allies to maintain a friendly attitude towards the attacked state and to agree on necessary measures to be taken. Since its ratifi cation by the last signatory, the agreement was to enter into force for a period of fi ve years, with the possibility of tacitly agreeing on a yearly extension. However, this agreement did not enter into force because it had not been ratifi ed by Finland. Th e main reason why the Finns rejected the agreement was the fear that in the event of the Germans attacking Poland, they would be obliged to fi ght the country with which they wanted to maintain good relations. For the Finns, the idea of allying with Poles became increasingly troublesome (Łukasik-Duszyńska 2008, p. 199-203) . Another conference of the three Baltic States and Poland, without Finland, took place in Warsaw. Th e topics discussed were: economic cooperation, cultural approximation, exchange of information and the current political situation in the region. Matters concerning joint defence commitments were not included in the fi nal protocol of the conference (Łossowski 1995, p. 254) .
However, eff orts to strengthen cooperation between the three Baltic States continued. In 1934, these countries signed a treaty on understanding and cooperation, which, however, was limited only to diplomatic and cultural cooperation. Issues relating to the security of the Baltic States were linked to the League of Nations. When in the mid-1930s, the position of the organisation began to weaken, partly as a result of an agreement between Germany and the United Kingdom, which practically put the Baltic Sea under the control of Germany, the Baltic nations tried to seek help in declarations of neutrality. Unfortunately, as it turned out later, it did not stop the aspirations of either the USSR or Germany. Th e independence of the Baltic States, which had been won over with such diffi culty, was lost after only twenty years. It should be mentioned that the international community was quite sceptical about the Baltic States. In Western European countries at the beginning of the 1920s in particular, there was a widespread opinion that the Baltic States could not survive on their own. Th ey failed to survive, but the reason was not the ineffi ciency of state structures; they were (just like Poland) the victims of the German-Soviet collusion on the division of spheres of infl uence.
Although Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia proclaimed neutrality during World War II, this did not protect them from participating in the war. Th e annexation of the Baltic States by the USSR took place in the summer of 1940. In the spring of 1941, national armies of the Baltic States were transformed into territorial corps of the Red Army, and most of the offi cers who did not want to submit to the Red Army were shot (Motyka, Wnuk, Stryjek, Baran 2012, pp. 17, 35, 57) . Th e secret police of the NKVD started surveillance, resulting in arrests and deportations of "enemies of the people" with their entire families to Siberia (Kasekamp 2013, p. 135 ).
Due to the barbaric Soviet policy towards the population, the entry of German troops into the territory of today's Baltic States was accepted by Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians with a certain relief. In Estonia and Latvia, the period from the incorporation into the USSR in June 1940 to the entry of the Wehrmacht in July 1941 is called the 'year of horror" (Motyka, Wnuk, Stryjek, Baran 2012, p. 36) .
During the fi ghting between the Th ird Reich and the Red Army, the citizens of these countries very often switched to the German side in order to return home. Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians (like Poles during the First World War) often had to fi ght on opposite sides of the barricade. In turn, the Hague Convention did not allow for mobilisation in the Waff en-SSS (the military arm of assault troops, formally independent of the German army) in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe. Germans, violating the international law of conscripts, listed these soldiers as "volunteers". At this point, it is worth emphasising that it was only Poles and Lithuanians who did not form such units in the Europe ruled by the Germans (Kasekamp 2013, pp. 141-142) .
At the beginning of 1944, the situation changed, when the Red Army was approaching the borders of the Baltic States. In occupied Latvia, about 160,000 volunteers had been conscripted by July 1944. Even in the last days of the war, one of the Latvian legions fought fanatically among Berlin's burning buildings (Palmer 2008, p. 397) . Th e situation was diff erent in occupied Lithuania. Th e promise that their Lithuanian unit would operate only in the territory of Lithuania and only under the command of Lithuanian offi cers resulted in the recruitment of 20,000 volunteers. Th e Germans, however, changed their minds because they began to suspect that the seeds of a Lithuanian national army were being formed in front of their eyes. Th ey tried to deploy the Lithuanians in various units commanded by German offi cers. When they demanded an oath of allegiance to Hitler, Lithuanians started to go AWOL on a large scale. Most of them fl ed with weapons in their hands, later creating points of armed resistance against the Soviet authorities (Kasekamp 2013, p. 143) .
Despite the eff orts made and the hopes that came with the political and military changes that took place between 1939 and 1945, the Baltic nations did not manage to win their own statehood and the Russians, after the Tehran conference, were given a free hand to reimpose their will on the Baltic States. It took more than 50 years for the Baltic States to rebuild their own statehood, up until the collapse of the USSR.
Reclaiming independence -shaping security policy
During the 50 years of Soviet presence, the authorities in the Baltic States had created very solid structures that had controlled almost all spheres of social activity, making it impossible for societies to make any changes. Th e legacy of the structures of the former USSR, and especially its former staff , who mostly remained in the area, even now allows the Russian Federation services to eff ectively infl uence the political situation of these countries. Th e possibility of political transformation in the USSR itself and the revival of independence movements in the republics that were part of the union and wanted to have independent states came with the 1985 appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Gorbachev wanted the USSR to become a state able to compete with the West. To achieve this, he introduced the "glasnost" and "perestroika" policies in 1986. Th e Baltic States decided to seize the opportunity.
In the summer of 1988, patriotic activity intensifi ed. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, banned national fl ags began to fl utter in the wind. In August 1988, Estonian dissidents founded People's Front, the fi rst non-communist political party. In October 1988, mass patriotic rallies took place and the fronts of the three Baltic States held their founding congresses and committed themselves to cooperation, becoming a model for informal democratisation processes throughout the USSR (Kasekamp 2013, pp. 168-170) .
In May 1989, on the initiative of MPs of the People's Front, the fi rst Baltic leaders' meeting took place in Tallinn, and a month later the fi rst meeting of the established Baltic Council consisting of presidents and top state offi cials was held to discuss common problems during regular meetings (Kasekamp 2013, p. 168) . Th e Baltic Assembly was established in November 1991 as a body of 60 parliamentarians to meet twice a year to coordinate foreign policy and to establish relations with Russia and other post-Soviet republics (Palmer 2008, p. 436) . Th e later objective of the Baltic Assembly was integration with the structures of the European Union and NATO. In autumn 1989, the then leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, wanted to save the empire and proposed a new trade union treaty to the Baltic states transforming the Soviet Union into a loose federation of republics, in which the states would have wide economic autonomy. However, the quest for independence was very strong in the Baltic States and took institutional forms. Th e fi rst free elections to the Supreme Soviet in the spring of 1990 resulted in people's fronts gaining majority support in all three Baltic republics (Palmer 2008, p. 436) .
Th us, after 46 years of Soviet rule, the process of gradual independence of the Baltic States began. Th e new authorities in the capitals of these countries embarked on the diffi cult process of building state structures and shaping their countries' security policies on the basis of the changing geopolitical realities surrounding them. International recognition was the only thing lacking for full sovereignty to be achieved. Of course, the case of the Balts was an issue that still enjoyed some support, but the international community's priority at the time was to back the reforms initiated in the USSR by Gorbachev and to end the Cold War.
Th e Nordic and Eastern European countries as well as the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (ruled by Yeltsin) were the fi rst to recognise the independence of the Baltic States, followed by other countries in the last week of August and the USSR on 6 September 1991. Lithuania and the other Baltic states were admitted to the United Nations on 17 September 1991. Although the Baltic States' independence is generally linked to the collapse of the USSR, the opposite seems to be closer to the truth. It was these popular movements in the Baltic States that increased the pace of democratisation within the USSR and undermined the foundations of the empire.
Lithuania
Th e beginning of the 1990s brought a consensus among all major political forces in Lithuania as to the choice of future direction of security policy. Lithuanians identifi ed three main sources that could negatively aff ect their country's security in the future: − external threats resulting from the unfavourable geopolitical situation of the country; − political infl uence from Russia; − an increase in organised crime. At that time, about 50,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed in Lithuania. Th is was a major obstacle for an actual self-establishment process and the ability to create an independent security policy in real terms. Th e negotiations lasted for two years. Th e Lithuanian authorities believed that the presence of Soviet troops on their territory was a violation of international law, which took place in 1940, i.e. after the Soviet Union attacked Lithuania and then occupied its territory. As a result of negotiations at the turn of the years 1992-1993 and following the attempts to put pressure on Lithuania to withdraw from its independence eff orts, an agreement was fi nally signed, as a result of which the last soldier left the territory of Lithuania in September 1993 (Kozakiewicz 2003, p. 14) .
Lithuania made its fi rst attempt at drawing up the initial assumptions of the security policy after the proclamation of independence on 11 March 1990 by the Socialist Republic of Lithuania. Th e creation of new structures for the future sovereign state began. One of the fi rst was the Ministry of Defence, established in April 1990. Th e next step was to create documents that would serve as doctrinal foundations for the future activities of the state apparatus. Such a document was the "Outline of the concept of national security of Lithuania". It was a semi-legal document intended for a small group of Lithuania's political elite, which was already made available in October 1990 (Kozakiewicz 2003, p. 16) . Th e authors of the document considered the policy of neutrality as the basis for the implementation of Lithuania's security policy, which, in the context of the geopolitical situation and the historical past, was then a short-sighted approach and now it can be said that it was even naïve. Th e elites quickly realised that Moscow did not want to give up its infl uence in the region. At that time, Russian Special Forces units of the OMON carried out numerous attacks and provocations. A particularly cruel event was the cold-blooded execution of seven Lithuanian border guards on 31 July 1991. Th is strategy was partly aimed at intimidation, but was mainly perpetrated to provoke Lithuanians to take violent steps. If they had committed violence, the Soviet authorities could have introduced direct presidential rule in the name of maintaining order. However, despite the pressure, the Lithuanians managed to stay calm (Kasekamp 2013, pp. 176-177) .
As a result of the brutal steps taken by Moscow, another project of the concept of national security, developed by a group of scientists from the University of Vilnius at the turn of 1992-1993, drew attention to external threats and pointed to the need for closer cooperation with the West. In addition to the economy and the political sphere, the project strongly emphasised the problem of national identity and identifi ed external threats resulting from (Kozakiewicz 2003, pp. 16-17) : − political tensions in bilateral relations; − tensions surrounding the stationing of Soviet troops on Lithuanian territory; − economic and political attempts to subjugate Lithuania; − tensions with other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (imposing a common defence space); − environmental threats from outside; − the infl ux of social pathologies; − a process called "brain drain".
Th e idea of close cooperation between the Baltic States and the Nordic countries has also emerged in this concept, which, for historical and geographical reasons, is their natural direction of activity. Moreover, a democratic and rich Scandinavia had great potential to support and build the democratic structures of the newly emerging Baltic States. In the 1990s, the Nordic countries engaged in this process primarily with a view to extending the zone of stability and development. Th is assistance included the transfer of used military equipment, training of soldiers and advice on preparing the armed forces of the Baltic States for NATO membership (Liik Kaljurand 2012) .
Th e implementation of the concept of integration of military and security policy with the West began in 1993 with the signing of two bilateral agreements on military cooperation: with Poland and the Czech Republic, and with the United States of America, the Mil to Mil programme. Under this programme, Lithuania received military assistance through counselling and training of personnel. In 1994, Lithuania also obtained assistance in the form of devices, ammunition and military equipment from Germany, France and Denmark. Lithuania intensifi ed its eff orts in this period to move closer to NATO and the EU, and, as a result of these eff orts, it joined the Partnership for Peace programme, became an associate member of the Western European Union and signed agreements between the Baltic States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland on the establishment of the Baltic Battalion of the Peacekeeping Force (BALT-BAT).
In 1996, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted a new concept of national security under the name of "the Act on the Assumptions of National Security of Lithuania". Its main message was to "develop and strengthen democracy, to ensure the safe existence of the nation and the state, to stop all potential aggressors and to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the state". Th e reference points are: "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; values of the nation, its rights and conditions for free development; independence of the state; constitutional order; integrity of the territory of the state; environment and cultural heritage". (Miniotaite 1999, pp. 16-17) .
Th e most important external threats mentioned in the above-mentioned concept of national security include: − the political ones: political pressure and dictate; instability preventing Lithuania from obtaining guarantees of international security; threats from foreign countries to use force on the pretext of defending their interests; attempts to impose discriminatory international agreements on Lithuania; − the military ones: armed aggression; military transit through Lithuania; penetration of armed gangs into Lithuanian territory; − the other ones: illegal immigration; transit migration; infl ux of refugees; attempts to force the rules of dual citizenship in Lithuania; − the economic ones: economic pressure; blockade or other hostile economic activities; capital investment with political objectives.
Although the document does not refer to specifi c countries as a threat to Lithuania's security, anyone familiar with the reality of the region will easily notice that the threats classifi ed as political, military, and partly economic are considered to originate from Russia (Miniotaite 1999, pp. 16-17) . Th e strategy has been amended several times, but its basic ideas and guiding spirit have remained the same and are now the cornerstone of Lithuania's security policy.
Another novelisation from 2012 was criticised by opinion leaders in Lithuania. An example of such criticism is the provision in the document stating that "Lithuania, in order to prepare adequately for the country's independent and common armed defence ... will strengthen the military's combat capacity ... and increase its reserves". (National Security ... 2012). According to the critics of the document, this was unnecessary and very expensive, and the legitimacy of creating a reserve army was doubtful (Wołowoj 2012) . It should be remembered that it was the year 2012 and the external conditions related to the existing potential threats were diff erent as well. However, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 introduced a completely new reality. A fundamental change concerned the perception of Russia, providing evidence to those who, up to that point, had doubts about its intentions to rebuild its former sphere of infl uence.
Th e current National Security Strategy of Lithuania, approved by the National Defence Council on 14 March 2016 and adopted by the Lithuanian Parliament on 17 January 2017, sets out the threats, risks and risk factors to which national security institutions should pay special attention. Th ese include (Seimas approved … 2017): − conventional military threats due to the readiness and determination of the Russian Federation to use its forces to achieve its objectives; − implementation and development of Russian military capabilities in Lithuania's neighbourhood; − military activity without transparency and demonstration of Russian military forces at the borders of Lithuania and other NATO member states; − global and regional instability; − terrorism, extremism and radicalisation; − informational threats; − cyber threats; − economic and energy risks; − economic dependence; − development of unsafe nuclear technology along Lithuania's borders.
In this document, we already have a clear reference to the Russian Federation, identifi ed as a factor that poses a real threat to the security and political stability of the state and the region. Th e strategy developed in 2016 is the fourth document of this kind since the restoration of the independence of the state. Th e priorities of the national security policy of the Republic of Lithuania and long-term tasks within the framework of the strategy include: − strengthening the country's defence capacity; − strengthening of NATO's collective defence; − strengthening crisis management and partnership within NATO; − progress in solidarity and unity within the EU.
Th e strategy envisages a consistent increase in defence spending to at least 2% of GDP and a further steady increase in defence funds, as well as an increase in the combat power of the armed forces, with particular emphasis on: land-based combat capabilities, airspace surveillance capabilities, and the development of resource stockpile capacity. Th e new document was supplemented by additional requirements for the Lithuanian Armed Forces: a rapid transition from peace to military structure in order to maintain a high level of alertness and a rapid response to external and internal threats (Seimas approved ... 2017).
Latvia
Th e ethnic factor should be taken as the main point of reference determining the subsequent actions of the Latvian authorities when considering the issue of Latvia's security. As a result of Moscow's policy of intensive russifi cation of Latvia for decades, at the verge of regaining their independence in 1989, native Latvians constituted only 52% of the country's population whereas Russians accounted almost for 33% of the country's population at that time. Other ethnic minorities living in Latvia include Belarussians (4.5%), Ukrainians (3.5%), Poles (2.3%) and Lithuanians (1.3%). Th e remaining national groups did not exceed 1% of the total population of the country (Eberhardt 1996, pp 55-56) . Demographic forecasts at that time indicated that Latvians could become a minority in their own country. It is therefore not surprising that in the fi rst years of independence, the Latvian authorities considered this threat to be the greatest. As a result, Latvia's national security policy was based on nationalist foundations.
An additional factor strengthening nationalistic trends in Latvia were the Soviet troops stationed in the number of about 40,000. Th eir withdrawal from the country, as in other post-Soviet countries, was a priority for Latvia. Th e negotiation process with Russia, which had begun in 1992, ended two years later with a series of unfavourable provisions for Latvia, such as the consent to leave demobilised soldiers and military pensioners in Latvia, the recognition of the right of Russian military structures to its own fi xed assets on Latvian territory, and even the consent to operate a radar station located on Latvian land.
Th e fi rst years of independence also saw the creation of security and defence structures. In September 1991, organisation of the National Guard and the Ministry of Defence, and later the Latvian Armed Forces and Border Guard Forces began. Th e State Defence Council was established to coordinate the entire state security policy. In 1994, a number of legal acts regulating the structure and system of state security were adopted (Kasekamp 2013, pp. 161-163) .
In 1994, NATO decided to open its alliance to the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States. In the same year, there was also a change in the security policy instruments promoting the integration of society. Th e nationalist narrative was, therefore, abandoned under pressure exerted by international opinion. Since 1995, Latvia has started to emphasise that regional cooperation is not an alternative to becoming a member of the EU and NATO. Th e forms of cooperation of the Baltic States and those in which the Nordic countries participated lost their strategic dimension and Latvia treated them as integration training. However, its omission from the fi rst round of pre-accession negotiations with the EU resulted in a decline in the popularity of the idea of integration with European structures in Latvian society (Kozakiewicz 2003, p. 33) .
In 1995, the Latvian Parliament adopted the fi rst "Concept of National Security". After several modifi cations, it was adopted as an offi cial document under the name of the "Concept of Security of the Republic of Latvia". Th e provisions of the document lead to the conclusion that Latvia's ultimate goal is integration with NATO and the European Union. Th e ideas of neutrality and regionalism have therefore been abandoned in favour of international guarantees. Although the threat of one of the Baltic States was still treated as a common threat, the main objective was to integrate with the European Union and NATO (Bajarnas, Haab, Viskne 1995, pp. 50-52 Th e priorities set out in the adopted document include the need to strengthen the borders, improving refugee policy and preventing the risk of their radicalisation. According to the authors of this strategy, in order to avoid threats posed by the foreign intelligence service and special services, Latvia should develop its national security and counter-intelligence service and pursue a prevention policy. Th e country should also develop public media, reduce the infl uence of the Russian media, control foreign investment and ensure a stable energy supply (Latvian parliament approves ... 2011).
According to that document, Latvia is aware of the Russian threat. However, its situation is not easy. Preparations for possible aggression or provocation by Moscow are not facilitated by the Social Democratic Party "Harmony", which disregards the threat from Russia and fi ghts for better treatment of the Russian minority.
As shown by data from 2017, Latvians constitute 62% of the total population of their own country and Russians 25.4% (Th e World Factbook, 2017) . Comparing the data from 1989, we can see that the Russian population in Latvia recorded quite a spectacular decline -30 years earlier, Russians made up almost 33%. At the same time, there was an increase in the percentage of the Estonian population, which from the point of view of the state is obviously very important. However, the Russian minority, constituting a quarter of society, still does not allow the authorities in Riga to sleep peacefully. Latvia is therefore anxiously looking at its eastern land border. Th e reason for this is a large Russian national minority, which may be a reason for the Kremlin to undertake actions which could destabilise the Latvian state. Th e maritime border and airspace of the Baltic States are also regularly provoked. For several years now, we have been dealing with violations of the territorial waters and airspace there.
Estonia
Similarly as in the case of the other Baltic States, the fi rst ideas related to the development of national security policy in Estonia have already emerged in recent years, when perestroika elites, observing the international situation, expected, to a certain extent, the collapse of the socialist system. Discussions on the shape of the new political order were mainly conducted by the dissident circles and mostly concerned the neutrality of the reborn Estonian state. Neutrality seemed to be the best, if not the only, option for Estonia's sovereign existence at the time. (Bajarnas Haab Viskne 1995, pp. 29-30) . Th e supporters of this solution stressed the lower costs of such a solution, in particular the argument of avoiding confl icts with Russia. Given that the neutrality option was supported by the Russian minority and by Russia itself, it did not gain support among Estonians. In the end, the conviction that resignation from NATO could leave Estonia in a grey area of security prevailed.
Since the proclamation of independence in 1991, work has started immediately on the future concept of security for sovereign Estonia. During the fi rst years of independence, particular emphasis was placed on the problem of the defence of Estonia and its armed forces. Th is was due to the elite's conviction that the source of national security was the independence and strength of the state. One of the fi rst decisions of the Estonian Supreme Council was the decision of 3 September 1991 to establish the National Defence Force. A dispute over the size and tasks of the armed forces built from scratch arose among the elites. Estonia is the country with the least potential and is also the least favourably placed among the 3 Baltic states. Th e source of the lively discussion was a typical dilemma for a small state which could not ensure its own security with its own armed forces. A central element of Estonia's security policy at the time was the concept of total defence, which consisted in simultaneous action by all state structures, especially the armed forces supported by the entire nation.
Also in the case of Estonia, internal factors played an important role in shaping the future security and defence policy. Th e most important of these was the fact that Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of Estonia. Estonia, like the other Baltic States, wanted to bring about a swift agreement with Russia on this issue. Th e negotiation process was protracting, which allowed the Russians to obtain more favourable provisions than in the case of the other Baltic States. Th e agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Estonia was not signed until June 2004. According to the agreement, Russian troops were to leave Estonia in July 2004. In practice, 1 000 Russian soldiers remained on Estonian territory. Due to the fact that Estonia was the most militarised area of the USSR (there were from 100,000 to 135,000 soldiers stationed there), it was diffi cult for the authorities to determine their relocation. 2% of Estonia's territory was administered by military authorities. Th e only training centre for nuclear submarine crews in the USSR was established near Tallinn. To this day, the majority of Estonians show a permanent syndrome of prejudice against Russians (Kozakiewicz 2003, p. 42) . Russia, on the other hand, is invariably perceived in Estonia as the main and even only threat. Th reats from Russia have been the basis of Estonian national security policy to date.
Th is feeling is further reinforced by the unfavourable ethnic composition of Estonia as well as by the emigration processes, which took on a dangerous dimension at the beginning of the 1990s. Almost 90,000 people emigrated from Estonia, with its population count at 1,300,000. For such a small country, this is a signifi cant amount. Just as in Latvia, Russians constitute a signifi cant ethnic group in Estonia. Such a situation was caused by the ethnic policy of the USSR and biological losses among the ethnic Estonian population, combined with systematic Russifi cation. However, the situation did not look so unfavourable in the country as a whole. According to the general census of 2000, the population of Estonia was 1 370 thousand (PC222: POPULATION …, 2000). Estonia's society consisted of: Estonians who constituted 67.9% of the entire society, Russians (25.6%) and Ukrainians (2.1%), Belarusians (1.2%), Finns (0.9%) and other nationalities (2.2% -Tatars, Latvians, Poles, Jews, Lithuanians, and Germans). According to the second general census conducted in 2011, 1294.4 thousand people lived there. Estonians constituted 69.7%, and Russians 25.2%. Looking at the result of the general census of 2001, we can see that the number of Russians decreased, and the number of Estonians increased. It does not change the fact that in the Ida-Viru County (149.2 thousand inhabitants), which is the third in terms of the size of population, Estonians constitute only 19.5%, and Russians 72.5% (PC0428: POPULATION …, 2011) and they overtly show secessionist attitudes. As a result, Estonia, like Latvia, started to apply very restrictive procedures for granting citizenship.
Taking all these factors into account, Estonians have taken the threats from Russia as the basis for their national security policy. Th ese include (Kozakiewicz 2003, pp. 43-46) : − resurgence of Russian imperialism; − the possibility of rebuilding the Russian totalitarian state; − initiating internal confl icts in Estonia in order to infl uence the course of events; − the possibility of economic and political structures in Russia collapsing; − subversive activities in Estonia; − manipulating the Russian-speaking minority.
Th e consequence of the threats formulated in such a way was a strategy of a "hard course" towards Russia. Th e political support given by Estonia to the West during the negotiations on the withdrawal of Russian troops convinced Estonians that in the event of a confl ict, the west would take the side of Estonia. Over time, however, under the infl uence of changing geopolitical realities, the strategy of a "hard course" towards Russia weakened. In the years 1997-98 Estonian-Russian relations improved. Estonia started accession negotiations with the EU and NATO. At the same time, Russia was proposing unilateral security guarantees to the Baltic States in exchange for withdrawing from applying for NATO membership. Th e Baltic States rejected Russia's proposal and upheld declaration of its willingness to join NATO and the EU. Th e Estonian authorities worked in this direction with equal intensity. As a result of the consistent actions of the government and elites in 1997, Estonia was designated by the European Commission as the leader of pre-accession procedures; however, it did not help it accede more quickly to the EU structures.
In the concept of national security adopted by the Estonian Parliament in 2001, the notion of nation as the basic source and subject of security policy was replaced by the concept of "Estonian society". (Möller 2007, p. 158) . Th is ostentatious change in the way we think about security has given observers the impression that it is a political exercise designed to produce the eff ect of portraying Estonia as a country free from nationalism.
Th e risks identifi ed in the new security concept are mainly characterised as economic ones (Möller 2007, pp. 158 ): − global recession or shocks in markets important for Estonia; − dependence on imports of energy resources from a single source (gas, oil); − Russian transit; − dependence on the Russian energy market.
Among the security threats identifi ed in the concept, it is diffi cult to fi nd direct military threats, either now or in the future. Th ere are also no threats of possible political pressure from outside, which could threaten Estonia. In contrast to the threats contained in the previous document, these are threats that do not relate directly to Russia. Th is document gives the impression that Estonia has no problems other than those mentioned above and that the existing threats will disappear once it joins NATO and the EU.
In May 2010, the parliament passed another "National Security Concept" and on its basis, the government approved the National Security Strategy of Estonia. It is a document currently in force and has not yet been amended.
Th e document states that although there are no existential threats to the security of NATO member states, the global and regional security environment is becoming more dynamic and unpredictable. New threats and challenges have emerged, while traditional security issues have not disappeared. Th e potential risks for Estonia come from hybrid challenges and mixed risks, as well as from a combination of internal and external factors. Th e authors of the document are of the opinion that national defence can no longer be limited to military defence, they claim that only a comprehensive approach to defence can guarantee the security of the country. Based on this main idea, the 2011 National Defence Strategy foresees that all major Estonian state authorities will participate in national defence, thus combining the capabilities of the armed forces with those having non-military defence capabilities. Looking further at the document, it can be seen that the main principle of Estonian defence policy is to ensure security for itself by its own means, with the support of its allies. Th e document also points to the need for active involvement in crisis management and peace support operations conducted by various international organisations (National Defence Strategy ... 2011).
Another document defi ning the direction of changes and the amount of expenditure on defence, as well as the requirements for the capabilities of the armed forces, all based on the National Military Strategy, is the National Defence Development Plan 2013-2022. It states that by 2022, Estonia will have formed a second infantry brigade fully assembled and armed, which will signifi cantly increase the defensive potential of the state. Estonia also wants to strengthen its ability to fi ght an enemy's armoured forces. In addition to the above, the development plan also foresees the need to have tanks with high manoeuvrability and medium range air defence capabilities. Due to fi nancial constraints, Estonia only plans to achieve these capabilities in 2022 (National Defence Development ... 2013). It is clear that Estonia, like Lithuania and Latvia, is aware of the growing threat from its powerful neighbour.
Conclusion
During the fi rst few years after regaining independence, the Baltic States considered several security policy options: neutrality or lack of alliances; tripartite alliance (with close military cooperation with the Nordic countries); and a third option, NATO and EU membership. Due to the Russian soldiers stationed on the territory of the Baltic States and the infl uence Russia had on their internal situation, at that time, they could not aff ord to direct their diplomatic eff orts unequivocally towards integration with western structures. Nevertheless, the policy of the Baltic states was based on shaping a positive image of the west and on an increasingly bold critical presentation of Russia's image as a country which posed a threat to its security, and the eff orts of successive governments were directed towards integration with sub-regional, pan-European and transatlantic international cooperation structures.
With the withdrawal of the Russian garrison, the Baltic states increasingly boldly articulated their aspirations to become members of NATO and the EU. In the second half of the 1990s, this became the main objective of their foreign and security policy. Before it happened, however, the Baltic States had become members of the United Nations and the OSCE/CSCE in 1991 and had become associate partners of the Western European Union in 1994 (Górka -Winter 2002, p. 479) and had signed association agreements with the European Union.
Th e concept of joint allied defence within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has been identifi ed as preferable to the concepts of neutrality mentioned above (e.g. following the example of Finland) or tripartite alliance with strong links to the Nordic countries. Th e concepts of creating a regional, separate security system (e.g. "Eastern NATO") or signing a collective security agreement between the Commonwealth of Independent States also seemed unattractive in the perspective of civilisational, technological and economic development. Th e Baltic States also rejected the idea of accepting a security guarantee from the Russian Federation. In non-military matters, the Baltic States decided to actively pursue their interests within the Council of the Baltic Sea States (Górka-Winter 2002, p. 479) .
While the participation of the Baltic States in the UN, OSCE and EU did not raise any concerns among their neighbours, the prospect of them joining NATO was a matter of discussion. Although Russia has repeatedly reaffi rmed the right of each state to choose freely how to ensure its own security, it has not seen a need for such a solution, and every step of NATO closer to the borders of the Russian Federation has been interpreted by the Kremlin as a threat to Russia. Also, Belarus, as claimed by President Lukashenko, did not hide in its statements of that period the suspicion that the countries of the Treaty and the candidate countries have downright hostile intentions towards Belarus.
Th e aspirations of the Baltic States were also met with distance from Sweden and Finland, which are still outside NATO. Th ese countries were afraid not so much of Russia's reaction as of the need to redefi ne their own security policies -questions about the sense of neutrality still remain valid both in Sweden and Finland. Sweden and Finland encouraged the Baltic States in particular to make eff orts to join the structures of the European Union, which was at the time in the process of implementing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and to cooperate within the framework of the NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) Agreement.
Strengthening economic cooperation with the Scandinavian countries (the largest investors in the Baltic States) is also conducive to developing cooperation in the fi eld of security. On one hand, the Scandinavian countries are interested in doing so, both because of the wider security of the Baltic Sea and because of the potential benefi ts for their defence industries. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that there is practically no arms industry in the Baltic States, which means that these countries are forced to import (almost entirely) arms for their armed forces (Pacuła 2013, p. 59) .
Joining NATO in 2004 not only increased the sense of security in the Baltic States, but also extended the area of stability on the European continent to the newly joining member states. Th e Baltic States are actively involved in alliance projects and their contribution to foreign missions, taking into account their population potential, was one of the largest in NATO. Th ese countries present a position identical to Poland in many key aspects of security policy, which often results in joint actions within the ranks of NATO (Pacuła 2013, pp. 58-59) . Th rough joint lobbying to strengthen collective defence, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were included in the Eagle Guardian contingency plan in 2010.
Th ere has been a completely new situation since 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimea and became involved in the confl ict in eastern Ukraine. Th e new reality meant that one of the fi rst steps taken by Lithuania was to restore the basic military service in March 2015 by the Lithuanian Parliament.
Although the Baltic States consider armed aggression to be unlikely, they do not rule it out. Th e authorities of these countries believe that Moscow, which has long pursued a very aggressive policy towards them, using various forms of pressure, is threatening their stability and even the territorial integration of the region. An attempt to restore infl uence or even subjugate the former Soviet republics is very real. For example, in order to have a land connection with the Kaliningrad Oblast, which, due to its strategic location, plays a huge role for Russia. Moreover, the location of the Baltic States creates a natural political and military line between Russia and broad and independent access to the Baltic Sea.
Th e Baltic States became aware of Russia's intention to rebuild its former sphere of infl uence as early as in 2008, after the war in Georgia. Th e annexation of Crimea by Russia only confi rmed the Balts desire to strengthen their defence capabilities. Even before 2014, the Baltic States were among the fi rst to signal Russia's desire to regain the status of a global power and the increase in tensions between Russia and NATO. In their 2010-2012 strategy documents, the Baltic States decided to devote more attention to conventional threats, foreign security operations and cyber security. In 2012, Lithuania and Latvia announced a gradual increase in defence spending to 2% of GDP. In response to Russian actions, the Baltic States have intensifi ed their eff orts to increase their own military capabilities and to ensure a permanent presence of NATO forces on their territory, which was the main objective of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia at the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016. At the beginning of 2017, NATO deployed four battalion groups in the Baltic States and Poland.
